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Introduction
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The financial crisis that originated in the US subprime mortgage market in the summer 2007 has negatively affected banks' funding conditions for an extended period of time, especially in some peripheral euro area countries, due to a general overhauling of risk profiles both at the corporate and sovereign level. In addition, national and supranational measures aimed at supporting the financial system and extensive changes in prudential regulation have often induced market distortions and substitution effects among different financial instruments.
The aim of the paper is to investigate the evolution of the cost of bond funding over a period which include the first wave of the global financial crisis and the following euro area sovereign debt market turmoil.
A distinctive feature of our paper is that we look at the cost of funding actually faced by banks, namely the price at which the bond is sold on the primary market. By relying on the asset swap spread paid at origination on over 5,500 bonds, we analyse the role played by ban k characteristics, issuance features and market sentiments. We focus on two issues: the role of the sovereign in providing both implicit support to the financial system and explicit guarantees on bank bonds, and the growing size and complexity of financial institutions leading to the too-big-to-fail safety net (Mishkin, 2006) and the too-complex-toprice syndrome (Haldane, 2012) , which have opposite implications for investors' monitoring. In fact, the former suggest a weakened market discipline, whereas the latter implies enhanced market monitoring.
As for the role of the sovereign, there is empirical evidence that governments of strong creditworthiness provide an implicit guarantee to the banking system of the domestic economy (Sironi 2003; Gropp et al. 2011, Packer and Tarashev 2011; Ueda and Weder di Mauro 2013) . This effect goes through a higher rating assigned to financial institutions which benefit of the implicit support. In particular, rating agencies often assign two different ratings to banks, which are usually referred to as "stand-alone" and "all-in" ratings. Both reflect the assessment of the probability of default by the bank, but only the 1 The author would like to thank Piergiorgio Alessandri, Davide Avino, Olivier Bruno, Lorenzo Burlon, Andrea Cardillo, Cornelia Düwel, Giuseppe Grande, Aviram Levy, Sergio Masciantonio and Stefano Siviero for helpful discussions and useful suggestions. The views expressed in the paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 1 latter includes the possibility of a public bail-out. According to this literature, the difference between the two ratings should represent the uplift (i.e. the implicit support) provided by the sovereign. More recently, explicit government guarantees on bank bonds were introduced since October 2008 by almost all advanced economies in response to the sharp deterioration of financial market conditions which followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers. While guarantees proved effective in restoring bank funding, they were also responsible of distortions in the functioning of the corporate bond market. In fact, the pricing of such bonds was strongly clustered on a country basis suggesting that in many instances "weak" banks from "strong" countries had access to cheaper funding than "strong" banks from "weak" countries Grande et al. 2011) .
As concern banks' dimension, our work is related to a recent strand of the empirical literature which tries to distinguish between the issue related to the size per sé of a financial institutions, which eventually leads to the too-big-to-fail safety net benefits, and the systemic dimensions of banks (relative size, interconnectedness and complexity) which makes them too-difficult-to-save (Völz and Wedow 2011 , Bertay et al. 2013 . While the too-big-to-fail problem -in connection with negative externalities and moral hazard -has been identified since long (O'Hara and Shaw 1990), the systemic relevance of banks and the \implications for the financial stability have attracted the attention of academics and, in particular, regulators only after the eruption of the 2007 financial crisis (Acharya 2009 , BCBS 2011 , Bernanke 2012 . Indeed, what makes a financial institution systemically relevant is not (only) the balance sheet size but (also) its magnitude relative to the economy, the degree of substitutability, the cross-country activities and the business model (FSB 2011).
To preview our results, we show that, with respect to AAA-rated governments, lower rated sovereigns add a burden to the cost of debt issuance by the domestic banking system. This implicit negative support intensified in the current sovereign debt crisis: we estimate that the absence of the backing of an AAA-rated government amounted, ceteris paribus, to an average increase in the funding cost of banks of over 140 basis points. However, once we restrict the analysis to banks for which CDS spreads are priced in the market -usually larger institutions which are more active in the bond market -we find that the bond premium reflects more closely the characteristics of each institution (soundness and creditworthiness), with the role of government somewhat reduced.
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By distinguishing between banks' absolute size (total asset) and systemic relevance (being included in the Financial Stability Board list of global systemically important financial institutions, G-SIFIs), we find that financial investors were able to disentangle the two issues. Our results show that the larger the magnitude of the balance sheet, the lower the premium paid at launch on bonds. This in turn suggests that the safety net benefits granted to too-big-to-fail institutions encompass also lower funding costs on the primary bond market.
At the same time, we find evidence of an investors' concern regarding the systemic relevance of financial institutions, most likely due less transparent business models and the involvement in activities less easy to price. Since the onset of the global financial crisis systemically important banks -which before the crisis were enjoying a reduction of the spread -paid, ceteris paribus, a larger premium on their bond issuance, The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the dataset and the econometric methodology. In Section 3 we analyse the factors influencing the yield at origination via a panel regression of the bond premia paid on the primary market over the period from 2006 to 2011. Section 4 concludes.
Methodology and data
In order to empirically assess the cost of bank bonds we propose a panel regression of the premium paid by banks on the primary market over the 6 years from 2006 to 2011. Since the risk-free component of the financing cost is unavoidable for the issuer, we focus on a market measure of the risk of debt issuance: the asset swap (ASW) spread, which is the difference between the actual bond yield and the fixed rate of the asset swap contract with similar characteristics. We do not follow the ASW spread evolution on the market after the day of issuance because the secondary market pricing of any debt security is a measure of the soundness and creditworthiness of the issuing institution in that moment but, from the point of view of the issuer, it does not change the cost of already placed bonds. In addition, the use of secondary market spreads is avoided because of the poor liquidity of the secondary market trading of some securities. Finally, yields on new issues reflect actual transaction prices rather than brokers' estimated prices. This approach, while reducing the time series dimension of the sample leads to large selection of bonds and issuing institutions. In doing so we follow the methodology used in the early contributions by Morgan and Stiroh (2001) 3 and Sironi (2003) for the banking sector, which has been recently applied to the debt issuance of non-financial corporations by Pianeselli and Zaghini (2014 and 50 basis points. Finally, the UK is the only country in the sample for which the average ASW premium at bond origination declined in 2011.
A relevant aspect of the global financial crisis is that it induced significant substitution effects among financial instruments, also within the medium-to longer-term bond class. In fact, given the widespread change in risk assessment, the increase in interest rate spreads and Moreover, the issuance of bonds was also affect, at least in the euro area, by the two ECB covered bond purchase programmes (CBPP1 and CBPP2), implemented from the second half of 2009, under which the Eurosystem bought eligible covered bonds up to a nominal value of 60 and 40 billion euro, respectively (Beirne et al. 2011) .
3 In addition to euro-area countries, the UK and the US, several other advanced economies introduced government guarantees on banks' debt (Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, South Korea, among others). were able to place subordinated debt and 47 exploited the possibility of buying a public guarantee. While there is again strong heterogeneity across countries, the average cost of the four kinds of placement clearly reflects the risk of the type of deal, with subordinated debt paying a larger spread than senior bonds (176 vs 77 basis points) and the two secured issuances being able to get a better price at origination: the ASW spread amounting to 45 basis points for covered bonds and 28 basis points for government guaranteed issuances.
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The analysis of the determinants of the risk premium on bank bonds is based on two main sources of influence: the characteristics of the issuer, and the characteristics of the bonds itself. In addition, we also take into account that the market pricing can be directly and indirectly influenced by the soundness of the sovereign. To disentangle the contribution of each group of variables we run the following regression by means of pooled OLS with time dummies:
where spread is the ASW spread at launch, Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the main variables employed in the estimations (excluding dummy variables). 4 To set up the dataset, we merge information from several databases. In addition to Thomson Reuters Datastream, from which the ASW spread is sourced, we take banks' balance sheet dimension and the number of employees from SNL Financial and Bankscope, CDS spreads and the government rating from Bloomberg, the bond features (bond rating, maturity, volume, currency of denomination, type of deal) as well as the bank rating on the day of issuance and the nationality from DCM Analytics by Dealogic. Finally, the list of G-SIFIs is taken from FSB (2011 FSB ( , 2012 .
Note that all exogenous variables are taken at time t (the exact issuance day) with the exception of balance sheet data which are lagged by one year.
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Table 3. Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics. ASW spread is the difference between the bond yield and the fixed-leg rate of a swap contract with the same maturity (basis points). Total asset is the bank balance sheet value of all assets (million of euros). Duration is the bond maturity at issuance (days). Bond Rating and Bank Rating are the average of the ratings provided by Moody's, Fitch and Strandard&Poors linearised between 0 (C-) and 25 (AAA). Banks CDS is the average of the daily credit default swap for 5-year contracts computed in the 15-day period before the bond issuance (basis points). Employees is the number of employees working for the bank.
Ceteris paribus, we expect that bonds with higher ratings carry lower spreads. With regard to the size of the issue, institutions that are more creditworthy typically find it easier to place larger issues, but they may face higher costs (yields) to generate a sufficiently large demand for their placements. It follows that the relation between the bond size and the spread is ambiguous.
At the same time, banks that are more creditworthy usually find it easier to issue longer-term bonds, but this kind of bonds tends to be coupled by a higher yield due to the longer redemption horizon. Again, the sign of the coefficient is matter of empirical assessment.
As regards the size (total assets) of the banks we expect a negative sign, insofar as large banks are supposed to benefit of the implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) support by the government. 5 As concerns the dummy variables: the rating of the issuer and the rating of the bonds are the average of the ratings provided by Moody's, Fitch and Strandard&Poors linearised between 0 (C-) and 25 (AAA); the rating of the sovereign takes the value 0 for AAA-rated countries and 1 otherwise; the time dummies take the value 1 for each given year from 2006 to 2011 and 0 otherwise; the currency denomination dummy takes the value 1 for euro-denominated bonds and 0 otherwise; subordinated debt, covered bond and government guaranteed bond dummies take the value 1 for each specific deal type and 0 otherwise; sovereign debt crisis takes the value 1 from 2010Q3 to 2011Q4 and 0 otherwise; the global financial crisis dummy takes the value 1 from 2007Q4 to 2011Q4 and 0 otherwise; the pre-crisis dummy takes the value 1 in the period 2006Q1-2007Q3 and In particular, the idea is that the government will not allow large financial institutions to go bankrupt when their failure would trigger significant disruptions into the domestic financial system. It is thus assumed that, because of the TBTF support, investors expect the government to back the debts of these institutions should they face financial stress (Anginer and Warburton 2014, Santos 2014 ). This expectation is referred to as an implicit guarantee since there is not an official commitment by the relevant authorities. 6 While from the microprudential perspective the increase in balance sheet size may be a matter of concern, from the macroeconomic point of view, expansions of bank balance sheet (and private borrowing in general) are often viewed as a driver of the economy. However, recent studies signals that the relationship may be nonlinear becoming weaker (or even negative) after a given threshold has been passed (Arcand et. al, 2012, Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012) .
7 Note that the IMF/BIS/FSB Report (2009) is the first official publication dealing with the systemic relevance issue. In particular, it provides the first "guidance for national authorities to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets and instruments". The rule book by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS; 2011) contains instead the methodology to identify the global systematically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs). Finally, the Financial Stability Board is in charge of publishing each year the G-SIFIs list. 9
The cost of bonds
The first column of Table 4 shows the basic regression: by looking at the bank characteristics we find, as expected, that the rating of the bank has a negative influence on the spread at launch: the better the rating, the lower the issuance cost.
8 At the same time, the size of the bank -measured as the number of employees -turns out to be non statistically significant at the usual confidence levels. 9 As for the issue features, the maturity at issuance of the bond is positively related to the cost, while the bond rating affects negatively the ASW spread at origination. The issuance of subordinated debt amounts to an increase of 57 basis points with respect to senior bonds, while the coefficient of the covered bonds is not statistically different from zero. Another bond characteristics which is statistically significant is the euro denomination of the issue, which pays a spread worth 56 basis points less than other currencies, while the coefficient on the volume of the issue is not different from zero.
To take into account the country effects related to nationality of the issuer, we introduce a sovereign rating dummy variable, 10 the idea being that government of strong creditworthiness provide an implicit guarantee on the banking system of the country (Gropp et al. 2011 ). The variable turns out to be highly significant: bonds issued by banks from non AAA states pay 80 basis points more than banks with AAA-rated sovereigns.
We then add two other variables in order to consider: first, the distinctive features of the government guaranteed issues; secondly, the turbulences spilled over to the corporate bond market from the sovereign debt market starting from mid-2010 (Table 4 , second column). 11 As for the former, the support of the public scheme can be measured in an average reduction in the issuance premium of around 32 basis point, while the increase in the ASW spread at launch due to the sovereign debt crisis is assessed in 33 basis points.
However, these two coefficients do not consider the effect (negative or positive) of the creditworthiness of the sovereign in those particular contexts. We thus interact the two dummy variables with the sovereign rating variable. Column 3 of Table 4 shows that indeed there are significant differences between AAA countries and the others. The explicit guarantee of a weak sovereign is worth 116 basis points less than the one from top-rated sovereign. Given the broad difference, this in turn suggests that it might well be the case that riskier banks with a lower rating but from sounder states could tap the bond market at a better price than sounder banks from weaker states. Thus confirming the finding in Levy and Zaghini (2011) and in Grande et al. (2011) that in the guaranteed bank debt market the security pricing strongly reflects the characteristics of the guarantor whereas bank-specific and issue-specific factors play only a minor role. 12 Given that -when looking separately at the effect of the sovereign debt crisis on AAA-rated countries and lower rated ones (Table 4 , third column) -the "Sovereign Debt Crisis" variable is not significantly different from zero, the overall effect of a non-AAA rated government is given by the sum of the "Weak Sovereign Rating" variable (33 bp) and the interaction between the "Weak Sovereign Rating" and the time dummy "Debt Crisis" (110 bp). The first column of Table 5 shows that the CDS coefficient is highly significant and with the expected sign: a deterioration of the perceived soundness of the bank (an increase in the CDS) leads to an increase of the cost of funding. By looking at the financial crisis period, we see that also for these institutions the cost of debt issuance is cheaper when accompanied by the public guarantee and more expensive during the sovereign debt crisis (second column). However, when assessing the creditworthiness of the sovereign as guarantor and during the crisis (third column), two circumstances stand out. First, the fact that a lower rated government is backing the debt issuance does not bring an additional (negative) effect on the cost of guaranteed bank bonds. Second, as for the whole sample of banks, the sovereign debt crisis seems to affect only the issuers headquartered in the lower-rated countries, namely those more exposed to the crisis. These findings suggest that the market is attaching more importance to the characteristics of the bank (part of the risk being caught by the CDS). In fact, if we compute the difference between the guaranteed issuance by banks in lower rated country and AAA-rated country the spread is only 47 basis points (the "Weak Sovereign Rating" dummy). On the other hand, the weakness of the sovereign significantly spills over to the home banking system during the sovereign debt crisis, the difference between top and lower rated countries amounting to 110 basis points.
As a further step of the analysis, we check for a relationship between banks' dimension/systemic weight and the premium paid on bonds by introducing in our empirical framework both the size of the balance sheet (measured by the log of total assets) and a variable identifying the banks' systemic relevance (being in the FSB (2011) list of the 29 banks labelled as G-SIFIs).
13 Note that CDS spreads price not only the default risk of the bank but also the liquidity premium on the outstanding debt of that institutions (Bongaerts et al. 2011 , Badaoui et al. 2013 ). The first column of Table 6 shows that bank size has a negative coefficient, confirming that a larger size, consistently with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, tends to induce lower funding costs. At the same time, the coefficient on the systemic relevance of financial institutions is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that systemic relevance might not be an additional issue with respect to the TBTF framework. However, when taking into account the likely non-linearity of the relationship, due to the fact that systemic relevance is a more recent concern, a different evidence emerges. The systemic relevance coefficient benevolent: there emerges a large discount on the risk premia associated to bond issuance of G-SIFIs (62 basis points, Table 6 second column). The implications of the systemic relevance of financial institutions most likely have been reinforcing the TBTF argument.
Yet, during the crisis, financial agents' mood toward those institutions changes direction:
debt issuance occurs at a higher premium (37 basis points), suggesting the emergence of an active market monitoring. Thus our results support the hypothesis that market participants are now aware of the new framework in which G-SIFIs operates and opt for a more cautious approach when dealing with their debt. The burst of the crisis and, in particular, the demise of Lehman Brothers may have acted as a wake-up call for investors. Results are confirmed when estimating a richer econometric framework. Column 3 and column 4 on Table 6 show the FE panel estimations when we introduce the country fixed effects and the type of deal fixed effects.
Enhanced market discipline for banks of systemic relevance is also found by Bertay et.
al (2013) As robustness checks of our results we restrict the sample to: 1) banks having a CDS only; 2) non-guaranteed issuances only; 3) non-subordinated debt only. Then we use several alternative definitions of G-SIFIs: the updated list provided by FSB (2012) which identifies 28 G-SIFIs, the merge of the two lists FSB (2011) and FSB (2012) which leads to 31 G-SIFIS, and the ranking provided by Masciantonio (2013) which replicate the FSB methodology using publicly available market data (27 G-SIFIs). Given the high correlation between the rating of the bond and the rating of the issuer, we drop one of the two alternately in the regressions. We also employ a variable for the sovereign rating constructed with the same linearization applied to the rating of the issuer and the bond instead of the AAA dummy. Finally, we rely on different time windows for the definition of "financial crisis"
and "sovereign debt crisis". Our findings about the sovereign influence and the difference between size and systemic relevance are not affected.
Conclusion
The paper provides an assessment of the determinants of the premium paid on bond issuance by banks in the US, euro area and the UK. We focus on a period (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) which includes the whole global financial crisis, started in the summer of 2007, which has evolved in a painful sovereign debt crisis in several euro area countries. The crisis has induced a deterioration in banks' funding conditions, leading in some cases to the drying-up of funding sources, the impairment of market segments and significant substitution effects among financial instruments. In addition, starting from mid 2010, concerns about the sustainability of public finances in several euro area countries led to a deterioration of the perceived sovereign creditworthiness. In parallel with the home country worsening of funding conditions and the related sovereign downgrades by rating agencies, many banks suffered the same fate with increasing CDS spreads and widespread downgrades by several notches, further impairing banks' funding conditions. In order to disentangle the factors affecting the cost of bond issuance we propose an empirical investigation of the risk premium at origination on 5,500 bonds. We find that the backing of an AAA-rated sovereign provides an important implicit support to the home banking system, while weaker governments increase the funding cost of banks. This effect exacerbated in the most recent period of sovereign debt crisis: we estimate that the absence of an AAA-rated government implicit support amounted, ceteris paribus, to an increase of 143 basis points in the ASW spread paid at launch by domestic banks. In addition, in line with the recent literature on government guaranteed bank bonds, we observe that the security pricing of explicitly guaranteed debt reflects by a large extent the soundness of the sovereign. Yet, when looking at banks having a CDS -usually institutions which tap bond market more regularly -we find that the premium required by investors is more closely related the characteristics of each bank, with the sovereign role partially downsized.
By focusing on balance sheet dimension and complexity, we investigate whether size and systemic relevance of financial institutions make a difference in banks' funding conditions. In particular, we assess whether financial investors are able to disentangle the two issues and whether there is evidence of a limited monitoring or an enhanced market discipline. Our results suggest that indeed the size of the bank is negatively associated to the cost of bond financing, thus expanding the list of the safety net benefits of too-big-to-fail institutions to a reduced premium paid on the primary debt market. At the same time, we 16 find evidence of enhanced market discipline of systemically important banks, since the GSIFIs selected by the Financial Stability Board faced an increased premium on their debt issuance. Given the length of the global financial crisis and the turmoil which followed the demise of Lehman Brothers, it seems that market sentiments have shifted towards a closer scrutiny of large and complex financial institutions and a different perception of their risk has emerged. In fact, bond holders may consider more likely than before their involvement in case of a managed bail-in. At the same time, it might well be that once the cross-border supervisions of G-SIFIs will be fully in place, with capital adequacy ratio surcharges and coordinated recovery and resolution plans, financial market will differently assess the risk of such institutions.
All in all, our findings suggest that the linkages between the sovereign and the home banking system significantly affect banks' cost of funding, in particular in crisis periods.
While rescue plans by governments and supranational authorities together with unconventional monetary policy measures have successfully supported bank funding during the crucial phases of the crisis, furthers interventions aimed at consolidating public finances, supporting economic growth and strengthening banks' capital cushions are still needed to fully regain investor trust and avoid vicious cross-country contagion effects. At the same time the size and the complexity of many financial institutions is inducing a reassessment of the rules under which they operate with the aim of making the failure of G-SIFIs less likely and the impact of their bankruptcy less widespread and costly. 
Annex
